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Abstract 
 
The aim of the present study is to recommend some principles for teaching science based on investigation of Feyerabend's ideas 
regarding the nature of science and the manner of its development. With regard to the aims of the study the qualitative content 
analysis as well as practical syllogism is used. Feyerabend rejects the positivist idea which states that sensational experiences 
create scientific and reality-based theories and believes that human different achievements, including rationalism, are different 
forms of life and are incommensurable. He concludes that variation of methods and theories in the different fields of knowledge 
are necessary for further criticizing and challenging and also the development of knowledge. Therefore, on the one side, the "A 
priori" role of observation is not acceptable in the formation of science and, on the other side; the origination and developments 
of science could not be explained based on some simple methodological rules. On this basis, some principles are presented for 
teaching science. The recommended principles include understanding scientific theories in the context of history, freedom of 
learner in scientific research beyond common beliefs and present theories and based on aesthetics, meta-physical and even 
religious tendencies, incommensurability  and non-falsifiablity along with the testability of the available theories based on criteria 
such as coherence, the degree of adaption with the "posteriori" experiential conditions and adventurous approximations, 
conceptual teaching instead of algorithmic teaching and subject-based teaching.          
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1. Introduction 
 
Science education and its shortcomings are significant issues which has gained international importance. Due to 
the importance of such issues numerous international studies are being conducted including the studies by IEA 
regarding the manner of education and evaluation for science and mathematics known as TIMSS which have been 
led from 1995 up to the present time.  
Nowadays the common belief is that teaching science should not be limited to the transmission of scientific facts, 
but it should aim at developing a scientific mentality in the learners that is the same as the mentality of well-known 
scientists such as Aristotle, Archimedes, Newton andEinstein. But, as Matthews (2000) indicates, this does not 
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mean to expect the learners to be prominent scientists, but it means that instead of transmitting scientific data we 
should develop a scientific mentality in learners so that they can attain a more complex and complete understanding 
of science and above this goal their epistemological awareness would be developed throughout their lifetime. In the 
same line, Scheffler and Siegel (Matthews, 2000), in agreement with Plato, believe that the procedure of education 
is not adhering to accurate beliefs but it is maintaining adequate logic for the beliefs. As Matthews holds, by 
stepping into this path some questions arise in the field of teaching science (Pp xvi-xvii): what is a scientific 
explanation? Who do models function in science? How much confirmation does a hypothesis require before it is 
established? Are there ways of evaluating the worth of competing research programs? Did Newton’s religious belief 
affect his science? These questions aim at probing science education from a different and more significant view.  
On the other hand, it seems that science education is associated with various views in the field of philosophy of 
science. For further illumination we can refer to the ideas by Clark (1989). As he maintains, definite philosophical 
viewpoints regarding the lessons are followed by logical necessities which affect the teacher’s teaching methods. 
For example, according to a view in the philosophy of mathematics mathematical facts are analytical statements. If 
this philosophical view is taken as hypothetical by the math teacher, in this case mathematics cannot be taught with 
the same method as the science which is taught based on hypothesis and experiment. Therefore, it cannot be taught 
in a “mathematics lab”. Clark also believes that if we adopt the views by Bacon, Kuhn, or Popper, the method we 
use for teaching science would not be indifferent toward these philosophical underpinnings.  
On this basis, it can be said that there is a more general relationship between philosophies of science and teaching 
science. Philosophers of science have constantly been attempting at illuminating the nature of science and the 
process of origination and development of sciences throughout the history. Subsequently, understanding their ideas 
can illuminate the nature of science and the manner of its development. This awareness contains many lessons for 
teachers and learners who are in search of knowledge and science and it can guide them in their journey to search 
science. In the same line, and as McComas and Olson (2000) also point out, philosophers of science need to study 
the historical, sociological, and psychological grounds in order to illuminate the nature of science.  
It is worth stating that some of the abovementioned points are also confirmed by some of the experimental 
research. As an example, Khalick (2005) claims in his study that the teachers who get familiar with the nature of 
science and how it is developed are more successful in teaching science.  
According to the presented issues, this study aims at investigating the relationship between philosophy of science 
and teaching science. Since both the philosophies of science and the education field are broad and various, in order 
to draw a boarder for the study, on the one hand the Feyerabend theories in the field of philosophy of science and, 
on the other hand, the principles and methods of teaching experimental sciences such as physics and chemistry, 
particularly in high school, are emphasized in this study. Principle, as it is used in this study, refers to general rules 
that guide teachers during the process of teaching.  
2. Methodology 
The present study has a philosophical nature, but due to the variation of the philosophical research methods 
(Given, 2008; Heyting, 2001) one specific method should be chosen according to the goals of the study. Therefore, 
in the present study the qualitative content analysis and practical syllogism are applied in different stages: first, to 
investigate the ideas of Feyerabend regarding the nature of science and how it is originated and developed the 
available literature, particularly the content of works by Feyerabend, are analyzed qualitatively. As Erduran (2009) 
also indicates, such theoretical and philosophical inquiries can provide the ground for deducing implications for 
education. In the second step, the logico- deductive approach was used as one type of syllogism (Haggerson in
Short, 1991) with the aim of deducing general principles guiding teachers in teaching science from the views of 
Feyerabend regarding the nature of science and how it is developed. This method is the same as practical syllogism 
by Aristotle that provides the possibility to inference the prescriptive statements from descriptive statements.  
3. The Anarchism Theory 
Feyerabend, an Austrian thinker, turned to philosophy after studying the fields of physics, mathematics, and 
astronomy. Being affected by the ideas of Popper, Kuhn, and Lakatos, he called his views regarding the origination 
of scientific theories and knowledge as Anarchism Theory.  
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Through investigating and rejecting the view that takes the history as a process of ongoing progress and 
evolution, Kuhn instead (1952) believes that it is a process of formation and decline of various and competent 
paradigms. Paradigm is like a framework that reveals the concepts, questions, and significant methods to the 
scientists working within that paradigm. As Kuhn points out, there is no criterion such as conformity with reality to 
be applied in judging various paradigms. Following this idea regarding the nature of scientific research and 
questioning the borders between paradigms and their incompatibility and incommensurability, Lakatos (1976) 
concludes that the unit of scientific discovery is not individual scientific theory, but it is research program.   
Rejecting the positivist view towards science, Feyerabend also rejects logical empiricism in describing the 
manner of knowledge formation and growth; therefore he rejects induction as one of the scientific methods (Sarkar 
and Pfeifer, 2006). Feyerabend indicates that such view is not compatible with scientific realities and it cannot lead 
to the growth of knowledge and finally there is the danger of dogmatism and dogmatic metaphysics as a result of 
applying them. In agreement with Popper, he also maintains that any sensory and observational experience occur in 
a ground that is theory-laden, therefore changing the ground and theories leads to the alteration of the manner of 
observation and conclusion. In this way, evaluation the credit of scientific theory based on the conformity criterion 
is not possible, because human sensory experience does not reflect the reality directly so that the conclusion, 
scientific theory, could be evaluated in relation to its genuine. Feyerabend (1999), in line with Kuhn, concludes from 
variations in grounds that scientific theories are also different and non-analogous. For example, Newton mechanics 
cannot be compared to Einstein’s relativity mechanics because they are related to two different ground or, in other 
words, worldviews.  
Feyerabend (1993) in a more general view and following the ideas of Wittgenstein, calls different human 
achievements as “ [various] forms of life” and believes that there is no general and universal method or criterion for 
contrasting different forms, therefore applying one of the forms in evaluating other is inaccurate. In another step 
forward, he regards western rationalism in the same way and distance from ideas of Popper and Lakatos by raising 
criticism over western rationalism. Rejecting any kind of fundamentalist epistemology, he concludes that not only 
cannot rationalism be accepted as universal and unique in theory and a way to achieve knowledge, but also it is not 
in the place to evaluate other epistemological theories and methods.  
On this basis, Feyerabend believes that variation of methods and theories in different fields of knowledge are 
essential for further criticism, challenge, and interaction of ideas and hence alteration and progress of knowledge. 
He takes every specific methodology to be limited and claims that for progress “anything goes” (Feyerabend, 1993, 
p. 5), and calls his theory as “an anarchistic theory of knowledge”. In further clarification he writes: “any being is a 
range of incompatible views, theories, tales, and myths that widen our views and awareness along and in 
competition with each other” (Feyerabend, 1993, p. 21).  
4. Investigating Anarchism Theory: a foundation for science education 
At this point the discussion is led to probing these ideas based on criticisms raised by some contemporary 
researchers in the field of philosophy of science, so that some of the principles guiding teachers in teaching science 
could be explained after the conclusion.  
One of the criticisms addressed at Feyerabend’s ideas is relativism (Glock, 2007). For example, as Feyerabend 
claims various sciences do not have common and equal structures and they are separate and local; the prior scientific 
achievements do not lead to a standardized method for resolving the present unsolved issues; and non-scientific 
procedures cannot be rejected through scientific logics. Some of the scholars conclude that these epistemological 
views necessitate democratic relativism (Sarkar and Pfeifer, 2006, p. 308). In democratic relativism various 
traditions, and even rationalism tradition, are equally translated into reality. In the same line Chalmers (1999) 
highlights that although several judgments of scientists in various fields of science are incommensurable and other 
factors such as personal, internal, subjective, and incommensurable factors have a role to play in theorizing, but it 
cannot be said that wisdom is not able to judge between theories, particularly the competent theories. In other words, 
other theories can be exposed to wise judgment, after formation, and they may be accepted or rejected. It seems that 
Feyerabend is also aware of this point. He(1977) indicates that we should not conclude from the incommensurability 
of two theories that they cannot be compared in any other ways. He believes that one of the ways to compare the 
theories is to contrast them with a set of experimental tests in various experimental conditions and consider the 
compatibility of competent theories with those conditions. He mentions the criteria such as non-linearity and 
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complexity, coherency,as well as novel and bold against conservative approximations for evaluating the validity of 
a theory compared to other competent theories. As it is clear, to somehow the mentioned criteria necessitate using 
wisdom as a judgment criterion about competent theories.  
Accordingly, negative view instead of positive and methodological relativism seems to be helpful in re-reading 
the ideas by Feyerabend. Methodological relativism believes that the procedure and methodologies for achieving the 
knowledge is pluralist and relative. With this view some of the ideas by Feyerabend such as “against method” and 
“anything goes” also take negative meanings: “against method” means against any specific method and “anything 
goes” means not being limited to principles specific to a method for guiding the choices and scientists works 
through the history. Based on this re-reading, he is, in some way, concerned about methodological dogmatism 
(Staley, 1999, p. 603) and his belief in methodological pluralism does not mean that he supports skepticism, 
relativism, or literal anarchism. His opposition with Popper’s specific methodology beside his support for pluralist 
methodology, his adherence to criticism and his belief in critical explanatory progress in science confirm the 
previously mentioned claims (Farrell, 2000, p. 257).  
The other point in criticizing the Feyerabend’s ideas is related to the concept of freedom. He has borrowed this 
concept from John Stuart Mill (Staley, 1999). Feyerabend looks for human’s freedom from all kinds of limitations 
including the specific methodological norms and even freedom from compulsion to learn science; hence he even 
allows learning myths and magic. As Chalmers (1999) holds, this interpretation of freedom means freedom from 
limitations, circumstances and social real possibilities that surround the individual and by ignoring them the real life 
limitations are ignored. So, he speaks about the ideal freedom which is indifferent to the historical circumstances 
limiting human being and he offers no solution for individual and society.  
Pointing to this weakness in Feyerabend’s ideas, Staley (1999) seeks the solution in the ideas by John Stuart Mill. 
In this way he recommends applying the principles and rules of art to science; the principles and rules that are 
provisional, incomplete, limited, excludable and local.  
At this point, some of the principles, methods and guidelines that can lead teachers in teaching science are 
presented according to the investigating and criticizing Feyerabend’s ideas: 
4.1. Principle 1: understanding science in the context of history 
 As it was mentioned, Feyerabend indicates to many historical cases of scientific theories and tries to explain the 
nature of science and how it is formed and developed in the context of history (see for example, Feyerabend, 1993; 
Feyerabend, 1999). On the other hand, as it was indicated in his ideas, scientific activity and striving for a better 
society necessitates attending to the present historical and social circumstances and trying to change them. 
Therefore, understanding the scientific theories for scientists, teachers, and the present learners requires 
understanding the historical evolution of these theories.  
According to this principle, the teacher can aim at reconstructing the learner’s understanding of a scientific 
subject based on the historical development of that subject. An illustrative example can be historical investigation of 
material structure and the element or elements that have made the universe. As Kirk; Raven & Schofield (2003) 
have mentioned, Greek philosophers were the first to raise the basic question of what element comprises the 
universe around 2500 years ago. Thales is one of the philosophers that considered water as one of the basic elements 
of the universe. After Thales, other philosophers as well as Aristotle tried to find an answer to this question; the 
answer to this question did not radically changed until 2000 later. After that, Boyle, Dalton, Thomson,Rutherford,
Bohr and Schrodinger provided other answers for this basic question on an evolutionary and developmental trend. If 
the teacher presents this historical process of this question to the learner, restates the ideas of these scientists by an 
expressive and attractive language, spends enough time stimulating it in the laboratories, and cooperate learners in 
the process of finding the answer, then learners’ previous understandings and knowledge regarding the structure of 
material and atom would be reconstructed according to the historical trend.  
4.2. Principle 2: Incommensurability and non- falsifiabilityof scientific theories along with the testability and 
competitiveness of theories  
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As it is commented before, although Feyerabend (1993) believes that theories are incommensurable but he 
accepts that the testability and competitiveness according to the criteria such as coherence, contrasting the 
competent theories with a set of experimental studies are possible. And he believes to be likely in various 
experimental and non-linear conditions, complexity, as well as novel and bold approximation.  
It is worth mentioning that one of the consequences for incommensurability of the theories, unlike what Popper 
claims, is their non- falsifiability(Chalmers, 1999). In other words, since theories are incommensurable falsifying 
a theory and proving another theory is not possible through applying criteria such as wise or experimental 
experiment. It is the reason that Niaz (2009), following Lakatos ideas, believes that scientific theories cannot be 
evaluated for accuracy or inaccuracy. He takes these theories as competitors that can be evaluate through criteria 
such as novel experimental documents, the power to explain experimental findings in a wider setting. And through 
this process it can be stated that this theory is better than that theory or, in other words, it provides a more 
comprehensive explanation of events. These ideas are in agreement with Feyerabend ideas, and in this way 
Feyerabend distances himself from Popper and moves towards Lakatos. 
Accordingly, teacher should also teach the learners that scientific theories are incommensurable and non-
falsifiable while they are testable and competitive. The teacher can apply the methods of critical progressive 
explanation for this purpose. In the present study, this method is recommended following the Popper’s idea that, 
“scientific progression is possible based on critical explanation of scientific phenomena” (Farrell, 2000). This 
method goes further than explaining methods in historical sequence, so that learners practice critical investigating of 
the competent theories. In order to achieve this goal, teachers can use the results of various studies to challenge 
learners’ former scientific beliefs. This leads to more engagement on the part of learners and hence a better 
understanding of theories.  
An example is provided in order to elucidate the principle further. As Niaz (2009) also indicates, merely learning 
atomic models of Thomson, Rutherford and Bohrsequentially cannot clarify the reality, why and how of scientific 
progress. The contradictions and the evolution of these competent theories needs to be further explained with regard 
to the new documents. For example, it should be clarified that Rutherford experiments provide some reasons against 
Thomson atomic model. This approximate model is bolder, more coherent, and complex, and it enjoys more 
explanatory power for experiments. In the next step, Bohr’s atomic model can be introduced as the complementary 
to the Rutherford model.  
4.3. 3ULQFLSOHOHDUQHU¶VIUHHGRPLQWKLQNLQJDERXWVFLHQFH 
One of the main ideals of Feyerabend is freedom of human being from the methodological and even 
epistemological limitations. The limitations have sometimes emerged as empiricism or rationalism.  
As the result, one of the principles that can guide teachers in the process of teaching is liberating learners for 
thinking about science above the common and available beliefs, theories, and methodologies according to their 
aesthetic, metaphysic, and even religious inclinations. This principle should be applied along with and in relation to 
the prior principles. In this way, critical explanation of the progress of science history along with the aesthetic, 
metaphysic, and even religious inclinations provides a context in which new horizons may be opened to learners’ 
new experiences. So, the teacher should create an atmosphere in which there is the chance for liberal thinking above 
retelling the present knowledge.  
The necessary steps in this journey include the following: first, the teachers should provide the learners with 
chances for further interactions and activities; this can be attained though active teaching methods. Second, though 
using simple examples, they should teach the learners that every observation can lead to many theories, hence 
observation and sensory experience do not have an antecedent or a priori role in origination of science; their role is 
subsequent or posterior and it is used in evaluating present or future theories. Niaz (2009) offers some examples; 
one of them is presented here with slight changes. For example, physics teacher can ask the learners to imagine that 
Aristotle, who believed that the earth is stable and the sun moves, and Kepler, who believed that earth orbits around 
the sun, are standing on a hill and watching the sunrise. They both are observing the same phenomenon while their 
theories are contradictory. Through this method learners understand that theoretical explanation and not 
experimental generalization is the basic step in origination of science. In a more general step, learners learn that 
there is no individual, stepwise, and universal method for science.  
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Finally, the complementary step is to benefit from rules and traditions in arts. Explaining these features requires 
further research, but it can be recommended to the teacher to respect and encourage different ideas and various 
views which have not been experienced and are against the common beliefs, theories, and methodologies. They can 
also open routes for creative precision and activity through addressing further questions as well as indirect answers 
and challenging questions. Lederman and khalick (in MacComas, 2000, pp. 83-126) present some examples that can 
be informative.  
4.4. Principle 4: Conceptual teaching instead of  formulaic teaching  
 As it is stated, with regard to the historical procedure of science evolution, Feyerabend (1993) believes that using 
some limited methodological rules in explaining historical activities of scientists as inaccurate, inadequate, and 
unreal. So, if teachers aim at developing the scientist mentality in learners, they should follow conceptual education 
instead of formulaic education. In formulaic education teacher introduces a formula for solving the problems after 
presenting the subject. Then s/he uses the formula in solving some primary examples and then asks the learners to 
apply the formula in other more difficult problems. The personal experiences of the researcher in teaching chemistry 
and physics in high schools show that these formulas are mainly created by the teachers and not the scientists and, 
for example, some of them do not even exist in the science school textbooks. In such cases, the formulas are the 
result of summarizing the issues that have been formed throughout the history and they have been gradually evolved 
and completed. That is the reason Niaz (2009) also indicates that the formulas are formed after conceptual Gestalt. 
These formulas are typically prescribed to the learners without any indication to the process of formation. Although 
they are applicable to solving some problems and tests, they limit learners’ understanding of the historical process 
occurred.  
According to this principle, teachers should provide the learners with chance for understanding the formulas 
instead of memorizing them and they can benefit from methods and guidelines such as simplification and using 
everyday experiences of the learners. It seems that the pattern for science history is moving from more simple 
explanations to more complex and complete explanations. Therefore, scientific models and theories have been 
completed throughout the history. In this procedure the scientists have added some knowledge, that maybe 
insignificant, to the previously established body of knowledge with regard to the historical background and their 
own experiences. As a result, teachers can move toward evolving models and theories using simplification and 
departing from simple models and theories and in the context of learners’ everyday experiences, gradually and along 
with the conceptual and historical procedure. 
The final example is gas rules in the field of thermodynamics. This rule explains the relationship between 
pressure, volume, temperature and the numbers of moles of a very thin gas with the signs of P, V, T, and n. This rule 
resulted from research by scientists such as Boyleand Marriott in 17th century on the one hand, and Charlesand 
Gay-Lussac in 18th century on the other hand. Nevertheless, to present this rule the teacher should not start from the 
results as PV=nRT. In contrast, s/he should face the students with the experiments that for example English 
scientist, Boyle, conducted in 1662 so that they understand the relationship between pressure, volume, and a very 
thin gas, and then they can follow this topic with other scientists who formed this rule. Obviously, the teacher should 
attend to other principles in this journey. In this way teacher develops conceptual Gestalt regarding this rule in the 
learners. During this procedure, the teacher can teach the learners that, on the one hand, these results are obtained 
from classical physics theories such as Newton definition for pressure and, on the other hand, other methods and 
approaches may also lead to these results and other results through using other basic assumptions such as those of 
quantum physics.  
 
5. Conclusion 
If the goal of teaching science is to develop scientific mentality in the learners instead of transmission of 
scientific data, the learners achieve a more complex and complete understanding of the procedure of formation and 
development of science and are able to think and live according to that mentality. In this procedure the philosophy 
of science can offer guidelines leading teachers, which were discussed in the present study. Obviously, this study 
mainly focused on guidelines for teachers of experimental sciences such as physics and chemistry, particularly in 
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high schools. Following the present study, future studies may investigate other elements and aspects of this issue 
and in other educational grades. Probing the experimental findings of this study can also be the topic of other 
studies.  
According to the findings of this study, a basic reconsideration in the inductive view and following that 
reconsideration in many misunderstandings in teaching science is recommended. In this regard it is necessary for the 
educational practitioners and policy makers to define novel goals and orientations for curricula as well as science 
textbook according to new horizons that philosophy of science opens. And they should also prepare teachers for 
pursuing the new paths that lead to developing scientific view in the students. 
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